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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Respondent, 2
v.

:

KEVIN NIELD,

:

Defendant-Appellant.

Case No. 890465-CA

Category No. 2

:

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction of burglary of a
business, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-6-202 (1978), in the Fourth Judicial District Court, in and
for Millard County, State of Utah, the Honorable Cullen Y.
Christensen, presiding.
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1989).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENT ON APPEAL
Defendant's issues on appeal are whether defendant's
sixth amendment right to confront witnesses against him was
violated and whether the trial court properly denied defendant's
motion to suppress evidence.

Although defendant was convicted of theft, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1978), a second degree felony pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412(1)(b)(i) (1978) (amended 1989), as well
as burglary of a business, he has chosen to appeal only the
burglary conviction. Judgment was entered in accordance with the
two convictions on August 23, 1989 (R. 216-221).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
U.S. Const, amend. IV:
The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
U.S. Const, amend. VI:
In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the
State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall
have been previously ascertained by law, and
to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation; to be confronted with the
witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,
and to have the Assistance of counsel for his
defense,
STATEMENT OF CASE
Defendant, Kevin Jon Nield, was charged with burglary
of a business and theft (R. 3, 4). Defendant filed a motion to
suppress evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant based on
the belief that the warrant description of property to be seized
was insufficiently particular (R. 30-32).

The trial court denied

defendant's motion, and defendant was convicted on both counts
after a jury trial (R. 151-52).

Defendant appeals only the

burglary conviction.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On the evening of May 16, 1988, at approximately 9:30
to 10:00 p.m., Gerald Freeman, the owner of Fillmore Diesel,
Fillmore, Utah, received information that his business might be
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(R. 9). At 12:15 a.m. on May 18, Deputy Corry searched
defendant's apartment and seized numerous items, including a pair
of 18 inch bolt cutters, which were found in the clothes closet
in the front room of the apartment (R. 12; S.H. 9, 20; T. 88,
90).

Defendant and co-defendant Richard Alvin Likes were then

arrested and charged with burglary and theft.

Mr. Freeman

subsequently identified the bolt cutters as possibly his, since
he was required by state law to have bolt cutters for his
wreckers, and he had found an 18 inch set missing from one of his
vehicles (S.H. 39-40; T. 129-30).
Defendant filed a motion to suppress the bolt cutters,
arguing that the warrant under which they were seized lacked the
requisite particularity (R. 30-31).

Af-':er a hearing on the

motion to suppress, the trial court denied the motion.
so it issued extensive, specific findings of fact.

In doing

The court

found that Mr. Freeman maintained a shop filled with "all types
of small and large tools including hand tools, power tools, air
tools and equipment of all types" needed to repair heavy
equipment and that on the night of the burglary he was able to
point out "several more significant items of equipment . . .
missing such as a mig welder and . . . [a] desk calculator but
• . was not able to identify each specific item of tools [sic]
because of the large inventory and numerous types" he kept (R.
58-9).

It found that Mr. Freeman could not tell specifically

what was missing until he did a complete inventory and that in
the meantime Mr. Freeman was informed that some of his "stuff"
could be found in defendant's apartment (R. 59-60).
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similar" to the tread on the footprints he photographed at
Fillmore Diesel on the night of the burglary (T. 95). Also
received into evidence were a sander, two jack stands and a mig
welder, found in a box underneath a pile of "junk" in the shed
behind defendant's apartment in October, 1988, and turned over to
the sheriff on January 5, 1989 (T. 98-100, 243-49).

Mr. Freeman

positively identified the mig welder as his and testified that he
believed the jack stands and sanders were also his because they
looked like his, they were found with the mig welder and his were
still missing (T. 133-34).

Angie Carpenter, an acquaintance of

defendant, testified that defendant had told her prior to the
burglary and theft that he was going to break into Gerald
Freeman's shop and take what he could "get ahold [sic] of" to get
even with him (T. 164-65).

She further testified that on the

morning after the burglary defendant told her he had broken into
Mr. Freeman's shop and taken some equipment (T. 166-67).
During the trial Deputy Corry testified concerning his
interrogation of co-defendant Likes after his arrest.

During the

interrogation the co-defendant had confessed to the burglary and
theft and, in doing so, had also implicated defendant.

At trial,

the co-defendant declined to testify, and Deputy Corry recounted
the co-defendant's admission to him as it related to the codefendant's involvement in the burglary and theft (T. 222).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court properly admitted testimony concerning
the co-defendant's confession as not being a violation of
defendant's sixth amendment right to confront witnesses against
him.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERIA ADMITTED TESTIMONY
OF THE CO-DEFENDANT'S CONFESSION AS NOT BEING
VIOLATIVE OF DEFENDANT'S SIXTH AMENDMENT
RIGHT TO CONFRONT WITNESSES AGAINST HIM.
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case.

A review of the testimony in question and counsels'

lengthy arguments that preceded its admission will clarify the
factual posture of this case and dispose of defendant's sixth
amendment argument.
At trial the State sought to allow Deputy Scott Corry
to testify concerning co-defendant Likes' confession, received
during interrogation, that defendant and he had committed the
crime in question.

Although the co-defendant's confession was

admissible against himself as an exception to the hearsay rule,
all parties were concerned that the testimony would not "wash
over" and implicate defendant (T. 182-196).

In determining

whether the co-defendant's confession could be admitted, the
trial court reviewed both United States Supreme Court and Utah
cases.
In Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S, 123 (1968), a
postal inspector testified at the defendant's and co-defendant's
joint trial that the co-defendant had orally confessed to him
that both the defendant and the co-defendant had committed the
crime in question.

The trial court allowed the inspector to

testify and thus implicate both defendant and co-defendant but
specifically instructed the jury to disregard the co-defendant's
admission as it applied to the defendant.

The United States

Supreme Court, in reversing the defendant's conviction, held that
"because of the substantial risk that the jury, despite
instructions to the contrary, looked to the incriminating
extrajudicial statement in determining [defendant's] guilt,
admission of . . . [co-defendant's] confession in • . . [their]

joint trial violated . . . [defendant's] right of crossexamination secured by the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment." ^Id. at 126.
In Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200 (1987), the United
States Supreme Court fully discussed the narrow Bruton exception
to the "almost invariable assumption of the law that jurors
follow their instructions." Iji, at 206.

There the Court stated

that the narrow Bruton exception applied when the "facially
incriminating confession of a nontestifying co-defendant [was]
introduced at their joint trial." Ld. at 207 (emphasis added).
In Bruton, the co-defendant's testimony both "expressly
implicat[ed]" the defendant and was "powerfully incriminating."
Id. at 208.

In Richardson, the co-defendant's confession was

redacted to omit all reference to the defendant, and the jury was
instructed not to consider the co-defendant's confession against
the defendant.

In upholding the trial court's admission of the

testimony with its limiting instruction, the Court emphasized the
narrowness of the Bruton doctrine.

It held that the

"Confrontation Clause [was] not violated by the admission of a
nontestifying co-defendant's confession with a proper limiting
instruction when . . . the confession [was] redacted to eliminate
not only the defendant's name, but any reference to his or her
existence." I^d. at 211.
The Utah Supreme Court has adopted the Bruton and
Richardson analysis of the sixth amendment right to
confrontation.

In State v. Ellis, 748 P.2d 188 (Utah 1987), the

Utah Supreme Court interpreted Bruton and declined to apply it to

the facts of that case.

There, inconsistent statements made by

co-defendants at the time of their arrest were admitted into
evidence by the testimony of the arresting police officer.
Because the statements did not rise to the level of directly
implicating either defendant, the Court did not apply Bruton,
stating that to invoke the Bruton doctrine, "a statement must be
powerfully and facially incriminating with respect to the other
defendant and must directly, rather than indirectly, implicate
the complaining defendant in the commission of the crime." Ld. at
190 (citing Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 207, 208 (1987)).
In the instant case, the trial court properly limited
the co-defendant's confession pursuant to Richardson.

The

pertinent portion of Officer Corry's testimony is as follows:
Q. [State] What did Mr. Likes [co-defendant]
tell you then during the interview,
basically?
A. [Deputy Corry] Mr. Likes [co-defendant]
told me that he broke into Fillmore Diesel,
that he used a set of bolt-cutters to cut the
lock, and that he took several items from the
business and placed them in an undisclosed
location somewhere in the Fillmore area.
(T. 222).
No reference, either direct or indirect, was made to
defendant.

The statement neither powerfully nor facially

incriminated defendant.

Therefore, the Bruton doctrine is not

applicable.
In addition to limiting the testimony concerning the
co-defendant's confession, the trial court here expressly
instructed the jury as follows:
In connection with the evidence that has been
received in this case, ladies and gentlemen,

there have [sic] been and offered a statement
attributable to the defendant Likes, to him
individually. You are instructed that
whatever weight or credit you give to that
statement is not to be considered in any way
or fashion in your determination of whether
or not the defendant Nield may be guilty or
innocent.
(T. 340-a).
The trial court limited the scope of Officer Corry's
testimony concerning the co-defendant's confession to permit no
reference to defendant and specifically instructed the jury that
evidence of the co-defendant's confession could be attributed
only to the co-defendant.

In doing so, the trial court properly

applied the protective legal standards of Richardson.

The

admission of the testimony did not violate defendant's sixth
amendment right to confront witnesses against him.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED THE
EVIDENCE DEFENDANT CHALLENGES ON APPEAL.
Defendant challenges the trial court's denial of his
motion to suppress arguing that the warrant under which the bolt
cutters were seized did not describe them with sufficient
particularity.

In reviewing the trial court's ruling, this Court

applies the following standard:
In considering the trial court's action
in denying defendant's motion to suppress, we
will not disturb its factual evaluation
unless the findings are clearly erroneous . .
. . The trial judge is in the best position
to assess the credibility and accuracy of the
witnesses' divergent testimonies. . . .
However, in assessing the trial court's legal
conclusions based upon its factual findings,
we afford it no deference but apply a
'correction of error' standard. . . .

State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 327 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)
(citations omitted); See also Termunde v. Cook, No. 890495, slip
op. at 2 (Utah Feb. 6, 1990).

But see State v. Cole, 674 P.2d

119, 122 (Utah 1983); State v. Galleqos, 716 P.2d 207, 208-09
(Utah 1985); State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1268-69 (Utah 1987)
(which suqgest that the "clearly erroneous" standard applied to
the trial court's factual evaluation and its legal conclusion).
In the instant case defendant does not challenge the trial
court's factual findings, as delineated in its ruling on
defendant's motion to suppress and outlined supra.

Therefore,

this court need only assess the trial court's legal conclusion
that the description of items to be seized in the warrant was
constitutionally sufficient.
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution
requires that search warrants particularly describe articles to
be seized.

However, an exact match between the property seized

and the description in the warrant is not constitutionally
required.

In State v. Galleqos, 712 P.2d 207, 209 (Utah 1985),

the Utah Supreme Court stated:
The decision to seize must be judicial,
as opposed to administrative, and the warrant
must be sufficiently particular to guide the
officer to the thing intended to be seized,
thereby minimizing the danger of unwarranted
invasion of privacy. Accordingly, the line
between what is and what is not sufficiently
particular must be drawn with a view to
accomplishment of the constitutional purpose
and necessarily varies with the circumstances
and with the nature of the property to be
seized.
(footnote citations omitted).

See also State v. Anderson 701

P.2d 1099, 1102 (Utah 1988) ("The adequacy of a description in a

search warrant depends in every instance upon the particular
facts of the case"); Namen v. State, 665 P.2d 557, 560 (Alaska
1983) ("The requisite degree of particularity must be determined
by the totality of the circumstances in each case.").

In the

instant case, Deputy Corry, acting on a tip concerning the
whereabouts of stolen items and fearing that the items might be
disposed of quickly, obtained a search warrant based on the most
complete information he had available to him at the time (R. 7,
60).

A complete inventory of items missing was not available to

him at the time of the search, and his reliance on the warrant in
seizing the bolt cutters was justified.

This conclusion is

consistent with the language from a case cited with approval in
Gallegos, 712 P.2d at 209 n.10:
The amount of particularity required in
naming the items to be seized for a given
warrant to be valid will vary with the
circumstances and with the ability of the
complainants to be specific.
People v. Harmon, 90 Ill.App.3d 753, 755, 46 111.Dec. 27, 29, 413
N.E.2d 467, 469 (1980) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
Defendant's repeated assertion that the "shop
equipment, air tools, mig welder, desk calculator, auto tools"
warrant description is "generic," that is, applicable to an
entire class of property, and his reliance on State v. Gallegos
as being factually similar to the instant case are unjustified.
In Gallegos the warrant ordered seizure of "all controlled
substances and stolen property."

There, the Utah Supreme Court,

while holding that the description "stolen property" was
insufficiently particular, stated that general descriptions could

be held sufficient "[in cases] where attendant circumstances
prevented a detailed description from being given." State v.
Gallegos, 712 P.2d at 209, 210 (quoting Namen v. State, 665 P.2d
at 561-62).

Although the warrant description in the instant case

is substantively more particular than in Gallegos, even if it
could be termed "general," it would fall under the Namen
exception just noted.

The trial court's factual findings that

the victim was not able to make an inventory until after the
search and that Deputy Corry proceeded ~o obtain a search warrant
with the best information he had are unchallenged by defendant
and are dispositive of the issue.

The trial court did not err in

its legal conclusion denying defendant's motion to suppress.
Even if this Court were to conclude that the search
warrant description was open to challenge, the bolt cutters could
have been seized validly under the plain view doctrine.

As

stated in State v. Kelly, 718 P.2d 385, 389 (Utah 1986), seizure
under the plain view doctrine requires that 1) the officer be
lawfully present; 2) the evidence be in plain view; and 3) the
evidence be clearly incriminating.

The "clearly incriminating"

standard requires an officer to have probable cause to believe
that the item to be seized is evidence of a crime. Id., at 390.
See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326 (1987); State v. Babbell,
770 P.2d 987, 993 (Utah 1989).

Here, Deputy Corry was present in

defendant's apartment and searching the closet therein pursuant
to a validly issued search warrant.

The bolt cutters were in

plain view in the closet and Deputy Corry had probable cause to
believe them to be evidence of the crime.

It was Deputy Corry

who had first discovered the burglary of Fillmore Diesel and he
knew that the chain link securing the doors of the shop had been
cut.

Bolt cutters capable of cutting chain link, whether or not

they belonged to the victim, could be properly seized as evidence
of the crime.
Finally, even if this Court were to conclude that the
bolt cutters were erroneously admitted as evidence, enough other
evidence was admitted to sustain defendant's conviction, and the
error would be harmless.

Evidence of defendant's footprints on

the shop floor found on the night of the burglary, stolen items
recovered from the shop behind defendant's apartment, and
testimony by Angie Carpenter that defendant told her he intended
to break into Fillmore Diesel and that he had done so support
defendant's conviction.

No reasonable likelihood exists that

without the admission of the bolt cutters there would have been a
different result.

See State v. Nickles, 728 P.2d 123, 129 (Utah

1986) (citing State v. Hutchinson, 655 ?.2d 635 (Utah 1982); Utah
R. Evid. 103(a), Utah R. Crim. P. 30(a)).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's conviction
should be affirmed.

DATED this

<* *> day of February, 1990.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

JUDITH S.H. ATHERTON
Assistant Attorney General
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